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Abstract
We study how well a New Keynesian business cycle model can explain the observed behavior
of nominal interest rates. We focus on two puzzles raised in previous literature. First, Donaldson,
Johnsen, and Mehra (1990) show that while in the U.S. nominal term structure the interest rates
are pro-cyclical and term spreads counter-cyclical the stochastic growth model predicts that the
interest rates are counter-cyclical and term spreads pro-cyclical. Second, according to Backus,
Gregory, and Zin (1989) the standard general equilibrium asset pricing model can account for
neither the sign nor the magnitude of average risk premiums in forward prices. Hence, the
standard model is unable to explain rejections of the expectations hypothesis. We show that
a New Keynesian model with habit-persistent preferences and a monetary policy feedback rule
produces pro-cyclical interest rates, counter-cyclical term spreads, and creates enough volatility
in the risk premium to account for the rejections of expectations hypothesis. Moreover, unlike
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), we identify the systematic monetary policy, not monetary policy
shocks, as the key factor behind rejections of expectations hypothesis.
Keywords: Term Structure of Interest Rates, Monetary Policy, Sticky Prices, Habit For-
mation, Expectations Hypothesis.
JEL classiﬁcation: E43, E44, E5, G12.
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One of the oldest problems in economic theory is the interpretation of the term structure
of interest rates. It has been long recognized that the term structure of interest rates conveys
information about economic agents’ expectations about future interest rates, inﬂation rates, and
exchange rates. In fact, it is widely agreed that the term structure is the best source of information
about economic agents’ inﬂation expectations for one to four years ahead.1
Since it is generally recognized that monetary policy can only have an impact on real and
nominal variables with “long and variable lags” as Friedman (1968) put it, the term structure is
an invaluable source of information for monetary authorities.2 Moreover, empirical studies indicate
that the slope of the term structure predicts consumption growth better than vector autoregressions
or leading commercial econometric models.3
While the empirical performance of the term structure as a predictor of future economic con-
ditions has been amply documented, currently available macroeconomic models do not seem to
capture neither the basic quantitative nor qualitative features of the term structure. First, Don-
aldson, Johnsen, and Mehra (1990) show that while in the U.S. nominal term structure the interest
rates are pro-cyclical and term spreads counter-cyclical, the standard stochastic growth model
predicts that interest rates are counter-cyclical and term spreads pro-cyclical.4 King and Wat-
son (1996) compare a real business cycle model, a sticky price model, and a liquidity eﬀect model.
They emphasize that none of the models captures the empirical fact that high real or nominal
interest rates predict low level of economic activity two to four quarters in the future.
Second, if agents are risk-averse the term structure will depend on both the private sector’s
expectations and on the term premium. In order for the policy makers to extract information
about market expectations from the term structure they need to have knowledge about the sign
and the magnitude of the term premia. But as S¨ oderlind and Svensson (1997) note in their review:
“We have no direct measurement of this (potentially) time-varying covariance [term
premium], and even ex post data is of limited use since the stochastic discount factor is
not observable. It has unfortunately proved to be very hard to explain (U.S. ex post)
term premia by either utility based asset pricing models or various proxies for risk.”
We develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with habit-persistent preferences
and nominal rigidities to explain the nominal interest rate term structure. It turns out that the
model produces pro-cyclical interest rates, counter-cyclical term spreads, and creates enough volatil-
ity in the risk premium to account for the rejections of expectations hypothesis. In addition, we
show that the conduct of monetary policy is a key factor behind these results.
1See, e.g., Fama (1975, 1990) and Mishkin (1981, 1990a, 1992) for studies on inﬂation expectations and the term
structure of interest rates using U.S. data. Mishkin (1991) and Jorion and Mishkin (1991) use international data.
Abken (1993) and Blough (1994) provide surveys of the literature.
2Svensson (1994ab) and S¨ oderlind and Svensson (1997) discuss monetary policy and the role of the term structure
of interest rates as a source of information. Evans and Marshall (1998), Piazzesi (2005), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002,
2005), and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) are recent contributions to this literature.
3See, e.g., Harvey (1988), Chen (1991), and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991).
4Donaldson, Johnsen, and Mehra derived their theoretical results under the assumption that the capital depreciates
fully. With less than full depreciation, the results diﬀer, see Vigneron (1999).
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The rest of this Section discusses in more detail
the two problems in previous literature that we identiﬁed and goes through the related literature in
more detail. Section 2 explains the New Keynesian model we use, Section 3 discusses the techiniques
we use to solve the model numerically, and Section 4 explains the parameterization of the model.
Section 5 reports the results related the term structure—particularly in relation to the term spread
and term premium puzzles. Section 6 discusses the relationship between monetary policy and the
term structure. Section 7 investigates the role of the business cycle shocks in explaining the term
structure behaviour. Finally, Section 8 concludes. Appendix A derives the inﬂation rate dynamics
in our model. Appendix B presents results from seven diﬀerent experiments to illustrate features
of the model.
Cyclical Behavior of the Interest Rates
Donaldson, Johnsen, and Mehra (1990) show that in a stochastic growth model with full depreci-
ation the term structure of (ex-ante) real interest rates is rising at the peak of the business cycle
and falling at the trough of the cycle. In addition, at the peak of the cycle the term structure lies
uniformly below the term structure at the trough.
The economic intuition for the behavior of the interest rates in economic models is straightfor-
ward. At the cycle peak, the aggregate and individual consumption are expected to be, on average,
lower in the future and thereby the agents will want to save more thereby driving the interest rates
down. At the cycle trough the aggregate and individual consumption are expected to be higher in
the future and the agents, consequently, have less need to save and push the interest rates up.
Fama (1990) summarizes the empirical evidence on the nominal interest rate term structure:
“A stylized fact about the term structure is that interest rates are pro-cyclical. (...)
[In] every business cycle of the 1952–1988 period the one-year spot rate is lower at the
business trough than at the preceding or following peak. (...) Another stylized fact is
that long rates rise less than short rates during business expansions and fall less during
contractions. Thus spreads of long-term over short-term yields are countercyclical. (...)
[In] every business cycle of the 1952–1988 period the ﬁve-year yield spread (the ﬁve-year
yield less the one-year spot rate) is higher at the business trough than at the preceding
or following peak.”
It should be emphasized that Donaldson, Johnsen, and Mehra compare theoretical results con-
cerning real interest rates with empirical data on nominal interest rates. They provide two argu-
ments to justify this. First, in the empirical literature (e.g., Mishkin 1981, 1990a, 1992) the real and
the nominal term structure move in tandem. Second, the results for the nominal and the real term
structure in the theoretical model developed by Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) were qualitatively
very similar.
Both of these arguments have a ﬂaw. With few exceptions, the empirical literature had used
ex-post real term structure derived from the Fisher hypothesis. In addition, Labadie (1994) shows
that in a monetary endowment economy the results concerning the shape of the term structure
depend crucially on whether the real GDP is assumed to be trend-stationary or diﬀerence-stationary.
Vigneron (1999) shows that the same is true in a real production economy, and, moreover, the degree
of depreciation in capital aﬀects the results.
3King and Watson (1996) compare a real business cycle model, a sticky price model, and a
liquidity eﬀect model. They emphasize that none of the models captures the empirical fact that
high real or nominal interest rates predict low level of economic activity two to four quarters in the
future. Compared to their work, we include habit-persistent preferences and a monetary feedback
rule, and study the whole term structure.
Rejections of the Expectations Hypothesis
The empirical research on the term structure of interest rates has for the most part focused on
testing the (pure) expectations hypothesis. In this strand of the literature the hypothesis examined
is whether forward rates are unbiased predictors of future spot rates. The most popular way to
test the hypothesis has been to run a linear regression:
rt+1 − rt = a + b(ft − rt)+εt,
where rt is the one-period spot rate at time t and ft is the one-period-ahead forward rate at time t.
The pure expectations hypothesis implies that a =0a n db = 1. Rejection of the ﬁrst restriction,
a =0 ,g i v e st h eexpectations hypothesis: the term premium is nonzero but constant.
By and large the literature rejects both restrictions.5 Rejection of the second restriction, b =1 ,
requires, under the alternative, a risk premium that varies through time and is correlated with the
forward premium, ft−rt. Most studies—e.g., Fama and Bliss (1987) and Fama and French (1989)—
interpret this result as evidence of the existence of a time-varying risk premium. What models are
capable of generating risk premia variability similar to the ones observed in the time series?
To address this question, Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) a standard dynamic general equi-
librium asset pricing model as developed by LeRoy (1973), Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), and
Breeden (1979). The important result in Backus, Gregory, and Zinis that the model can account for
neither the sign nor the magnitude of average risk premiums in forward prices and holding-period
returns. The model is unable to explain rejections of the expectations hypothesis. A similar puzzle
has been shown to exist for equity premia by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Related Literature
In previous literature, Evans and Marshall (1998) show that a limited participation model is broadly
consistent with the impulse response functions of the real and nominal yields to a monetary policy
shock. However, their real yields are ex-post real yields. In addition, Piazzesi (2005) criticizes
their methodology on the grounds that it doesn’t impose the no arbitrage condition on the yield
movements. Sepp¨ al¨ a and Xie (2004) study the cyclical behavior of nominal and (ex-ante) real term
structures of interest rates in the UK data, and in a real business cycle, a limited participation,
and a New Keynesian model. Their result is that only the New Keynesian model gets closest to
matching the cyclical behavior for both the nominal and the real term structure. Unlike in this
paper, they use exogenously deﬁned money supply processes, assume that the Fisher hypothesis
holds, and employ standard households preferences.
5The literature is huge. Useful surveys are provided by Melino (1988), Shiller (1990), Mishkin (1990b), and Camp-
bell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). The most important individual studies are probably Shiller (1979), Shiller, Campbell,
and Schoenholtz (1983), Fama (1984, 1990), Fama and Bliss (1987), Froot (1989), Campbell and Shiller (1991), and
Campbell (1995).
4Piazzesi (2005) shows that the Federal Reserve policy can be better approximated by assuming
that it responds to the information contained only in the term structure rather than in other
macroeconomic variables. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) show that the monetary policy shocks can
explain 45% of excess nominal bond returns, and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) show that the term
structure explains 64% of the changes in the federal funds target rate.
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) study the inﬂation risk premium in a continuous-time general
equilibrium model in which the monetary authority sets the money supply based on targets on
the long-term growth of the nominal money supply, inﬂation, and economic growth. They identify
the time-variation of the inﬂation risk premium as an important explanatory variable of deviations
from the expectations hypothesis. In contrast, in our model the monetary policy authority follows
an interest rate rule which is closer to the actual conduct of monetary policy in most countries.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the in our model monetary policy shocks and inﬂation risk premium are
not the explation behind the rejections of the expectations hypothesis. Instead the systematic
monetary policy drives our results. This result is closely related to earlier studies by Mankiw and
Summers (1984), Mankiw and Miron (1986), and Dotsey and Otrok (1995) in reduced form models.
Sepp¨ al¨ a (2004) studies the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can
default on contracts. The results show that this limited commitment model is one potential solution
of the term premium puzzle. Dai (2002) shows that a model with limited participation is another.
However, both of these models study only the real term structure.6 One of our objectives is to
study whether a habit-formation model that in previous work has been successful in accounting for
asset pricing puzzles can also explain the term premium puzzle.7 Buraschi and Jiltsov (2003) and
Wachter (2004) show that an external habit model in the style of Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
can explain this puzzle.
In reduced form macro models, Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2003) estimate a log-linear three
equation New Keynesian model using a Maximum Likelihood estimator, and examine the term
structure generated by the model. The dynamics of the endogenous variables is driven by three
exogenous shocks and two unobserved state variables. While their speciﬁcations is justiﬁed on
empirical grounds—and helps to generate persistent dynamics—it allows many degrees of freedom,
so that the role played in the term structure behaviour by the endogenous shock transmission
mechanism of the optimizing model is diﬃcult to ascertain.
The research on joint macro-ﬁnance model poses similar problems (H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and
Vestin, 2002, Rudebusch and Wu, 2004). This literature aims at integrating small scale optimizing
models of output, inﬂation and interest rates with aﬃne no-arbitrage speciﬁcations for bond prices.
In this way, it is possible to identify the aﬃne model latent factor with the macroeconomic aggre-
gates. The bond pricing portion of the model does not have a structural interpretation. Therefore,
it is diﬃcult to evaluate the importance of the exogenous persistence introduced in this family of
models for the term structure results.
6In addition, there are a few recent papers such as Duﬀee (2002) and Dai and Singleton (2002) that study the
term premium puzzle in the nominal yields using reduced form no arbitrage models. We use a structural general
equilibrium model (which naturally implies no arbitrage).
7Previous studies include Jermann (1998) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001).
52. The Model
The theoretical interest rate term structure is derived from a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model of the business cycle. An important objective of the paper is to evaluate the role of
monetary policy in generating an empirically plausible term structure. Hence, we adopt a money-
in-utility-function model where nominal rigidities allow monetary policy to aﬀect the dynamics of
real variables. We follow Calvo (1983) and the New Keynesian literature on the business cycle by
assuming that prices cannot be updated to the proﬁt-maximizing level in each period. Firms face
an exogenous, constant probability of being able to reset the price in any period t. This setup
can also be derived from a menu cost model, where ﬁrms face a randomly distributed ﬁxed cost kt
of updating the price charged, and the support of kt is [0;k], k →∞(see Klenow and Kryvtsov,
2004).
While more sophisticated pricing mechanism can be introduced—such as state-dependent pric-
ing (Dotsey, King and Wolman, 1999), partial indexation to past prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans, 2001), a mix of rule-of-thumb and forward-looking pricing (Gali and Gertler, 1999)—we
limit the model to the more essential ingredients of the New Keynesian framework. This allows us
to investigate the impact on the term structure of four key features: (i) systematic monetary policy
modeled as an interest rate rule; (ii) nominal price rigidity; (iii) habit-persistent preferences; (iv)
positive steady state money growth rate. Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003) oﬀer a comprehensive
treatment of the New Keynesian framework, and describe in detail the microfoundations of the
model.
Each consumer owns shares of all ﬁrms, and households are rebated any proﬁt from the monop-
olistically competitive output sector. Savings can be accumulated in money balances, or in a range
of riskless nominal and real bonds spanning several maturities. The government runs a balanced
budget in every period, and rebates to consumers any seigniorage revenue from issuing the mone-
tary asset. Output is produced with undiﬀerentiated labor, supplied by the household-consumers,
via a linear production function.
Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Consumers demand
diﬀerentiated consumption goods, choosing from a continuum of goods, indexed by z ∈ [0,1]. In
the notation used throughout the paper, C
j
t(z) indicates consumption by household j at time t of
the good produced by ﬁrm z.
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and (1). When b>0 the preferences are characterized by habit persistence (Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher, 2001). Dt is an aggregate stochastic preference shock. Each element of the row vector
− → p t represents the price of an asset with maturity k that will pay one unit of currency in period
t + k. The corresponding element of
− →
Bt represents the quantity of such claims purchased by the
household. B
j
t−1 indicates the value of the household portfolio of claims maturing at time t.
The solution to the intratemporal expenditure allocation problem between the varieties of dif-











Equation (4) is the demand of good z from household j,w h e r eθ is the price elasticity of demand.
The associated price index Pt measures the least expenditure for diﬀerentiated goods that buys a
unit of the consumption index:
Pt =






Since all household solve an identical optimization problem and face the same aggregate vari-
















































where MUC is the marginal utility of consumption. The Euler equation for the time t price pb
t,k







7We deﬁne the real gross interest rate for maturity k as (1 + rt,k)=1 /pb
t,k. In a similar fashion,
the Euler equation associated withe the nominal bond yielding one unit of money with certainty













where (1 + Rt,k) is the gross nominal interest rate for maturity k.
Firms and price setting
The ﬁrm producing good z employs a linear technology:
Yt(z)=AtNt(z)
where At is an aggregate productivity shock. Minimizing the nominal cost of producing a given
amount of output Y :
Cost = WtNt(z)
yields the labor demand schedule:
MCN
t (z)MPLt(z)=Wt (9)
where MCN is the nominal marginal cost, MPL is the marginal product of labor (Yt(z)/Nt(z)).
Equation (9) implies that the real marginal cost MCt of producing one unit of output is:
MCt(z)MPLt(z)=Wt/Pt
Firms adjust their prices infrequently. In each period there is a constant probability (1 − θp)
that the ﬁrm will be able to adjust its price, independently of past history. This implies that the
fraction of ﬁrms setting prices at t is (1 − θp) and the expected waiting time for the next price
adjustment is 1
1−θp. The problem of the ﬁrm setting the price at time t consists of choosing Pt(z)























In (11), Yt,t+i(z) is the ﬁrm’s demand function for its output at time t+i, conditional on the price
set at time t, Pt(z). Market clearing insures that Yt,t+i(z)=Ct,t+i(z)a n dYt+i = Ct+i. Substituting












































is the ﬂexible-price level of the markup, and also the markup that would be observed in a zero-
inﬂation (zero money growth rate) steady state. To use rational expectations solution algorithms
when the steady state money growth rate is non-zero, we need to express the ﬁrst order condition
as a diﬀerence equation (see Ascari, 2004, and King and Wolman, 1996). This can be accomplished















ˆ Gt = µMUCtMCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ ˆ Gt+1 (16)
ˆ Ht = MUCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ ˆ Ht+1. (17)
Market Clearing
Since the measure of the economy is unitary, in the symmetric equilibrium it holds that:
M
j
t = Mt ; C
j
t = Ct
and the consumption shadow price is symmetric across households: MUC
j
t = MUCt.G i v e nt h a t
all ﬁrms are able to purchase the same labor service bundle, and so are charged the same aggregate
wage, they all face the same marginal cost. The linear production technology insures that MC is
equal across all ﬁrms—whether they are updating or not their price—regardless of the level of
production, which will indeed be diﬀerent. Firms are heterogeneous in that a fraction (1 − θp)o f
ﬁrms in the interval [0,1] can optimally choose the price charged at time t. In equilibrium each
producer that chooses a new price Pt(z)i np e r i o dt will choose the same new price Pt(z)a n dt h e




t−1 +( 1− θp)Pt(z)1−θ
  1
1−θ . (18)
9The Appendix A shows that the inﬂation rate dynamics is given by:
[(1 + πt)]


























= µ ∗ MC∗
(1 − θpβΠθ−1)
(1 − θpβΠθ)
Since Pt(z) is the optimal price chosen by the fraction of ﬁrms that can re-optimize at time t,i t
is the inverse of what King and Wolman (1996) deﬁne as the price wedge. With zero steady state
inﬂation the steady state average markup is equal to 1/MC, therefore there is no price wedge. But
when steady state inﬂation is positive, the price wedge is less than one: the average price is always
smaller than the optimal price, since some ﬁrms would like to increase the price, but are constrained
not to do so. Combining this equation with equation (19) gives the steady state marginal cost and





















The government rebates the seigniorage revenues to the household in the form of lump-sum trans-
fers, so that in any time t the government budget is balanced. Since we deﬁned in equation (3) τj
as the amount of the tax levied by the government on household j, assuming τ
j
t = τi
t ∀ j,i ∈ [0,1]










= −τt = Ms
t − Ms
t−1





We assume the monetary policy instrument is the short term nominal interest rate (1 + Rt,1).
The money supply is set by the monetary authority to satisfy whatever money demand is consistent
with the target rate.
10Domestic bonds are in zero-net supply, since the government does not issue bonds. Therefore
in equilibrium it must hold that:
Bt,i =0
for any component of the vector
− →
Bt. However, because we have complete markets, we can still
price both nominal and real bonds.
Monetary Policy
The economy’s dynamics is driven by business cycle shocks temporarily away from the non-
stochastic steady state. In this instances, the domestic monetary authority follows a forward-














where ωπ, ωy ≥ 0 are the feedback coeﬃcients to CPI inﬂation and output. The monetary authority
adjusts the interest rate in response to deviations of the target variables from the steady state. In
the steady state, a constant money growth rate rule is followed. The choice of the parameters
ωπ, ωy allows us to specify alternative monetary policies. When the central bank responds to
current rather than expected inﬂation equation (20) returns the rule suggested by Taylor (1993) as
a description of U.S. monetary policy.
We assume the central bank assigns positive weight to an interest rate smoothing objective, so








where χ ∈ [0,1) is the degree of smoothing and ε
mp
t is an unanticipated exogenous shock to monetary
policy.
3. Algorithm
We solve the model using a second-order approximation around the non-stochastic steady
state. The numerical solution is done using the approach and the routines in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004). It is well known that taking a ﬁrst-order approximation to the bond prices will give
no risk premia and that a second-order approximation will give only constant premia. The reason
is simple: the second-order approximation involves only squared error terms that have constant
expectation.
For this reason, in the ﬁrst step, we solve our model for six state variables and seven control
variables in 13 equations using the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe methods. In the second step, we
generate 200,000 observations of state and control variables. In the ﬁnal step, we regress the future
marginal rates of substitution—see equations (24) and (25) below—on the third-order complete
polynomials of the state variables to generate bond prices.
11Our approach is very similar to the parameterized expectations algorithm employed by Evans
and Marshall (1998). While they didn’t study the premia, notice that the algorithm amounts to
taking a third-order approximation to bond prices. With third-order approximation, the current
state variables multiply squared future error terms, and hence risk premia are time-varying.
4. Parametrization
Preference, technology and policy parameters are parameterized consistently with the New
Keynesian monetary business cycle literature. Estimated and calibrated staggered-price adjustment
models are discussed in Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Christiano Eichenbaum, and Evans(2001),
Ireland (2001), Ravenna (2002), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2003), Walsh (2003), Woodford
(2003).
Households’ preferences are modeled following the internal habit-persistence framework of Boldrin,
Christiano, and Fisher (2001). The persistence parameter b is set to 0.6, a value that Fuhrer (2000)
ﬁnds optimizes the match between sticky-price models and consumption data. The value of γ is set
to 2.1, and is chosen to provide adequate curvature in the utility function so as to generate enough
risk-premia volatility. The parametrization of habit-persistent preferences plays a very important
role in the model’s term-structure properties. Its impact on the results is discussed in detail in
Section 5. Labor supply elasticity (1/η)i se q u a lt o2 , and the parameter   is chosen to set steady
state labor hours at about 20% of the available time. This is a value consistent with many OECD
countries postwar data, although on the low side for the US. The quarterly discount factor β is
parametrized so that the steady state real interest rate is equal to 1%. The demand elasticity θ is
set to obtain a ﬂexible-price equilibrium producers’ markup µ = ϑ/(ϑ − 1) = 1.1. While Bernanke
and Gertler (2000) use a higher value of 1.2, in our model positive steady state inﬂation implies
the steady state markup is larger than in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium.
The production technology is linear in labor hours. Given that the model is parameterized at
business-cycle frequencies, this a fair approximation widely used in the literature. To parametrize
the Calvo (1983) pricing adjustment mechanism, the probability θp faced by ﬁrms of not adjusting
the price in any given period is set to 0.75 , implying that the average time between price adjust-
ments for a producer is 1 year. This value is in line with estimates for the US reported by Gali and
Gertler (1999) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2003).
Variants of the instrument rule (21) have been estimated both in single-equation and in simultaneous-
equation contexts. We set the inﬂation feedback coeﬃcients ωπ to 2.15, which is a value close to
the one found by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) for the Greenspan tenure in the US. The choice
of a value for ωy is more controversial, depending on the operational deﬁnition of output gap used
by the central bank at any given point in time. We choose a value of ωy =0 . The smoothing
parameter χ is equal to 0.8, as estimated by Rabanal (2004). Section 6 and Appendix B discuss
diﬀerent monetary policy speciﬁcations. Quarterly steady state inﬂation is set equal to the average
U.S. value over the period 1994−2004, about 0.75% on a quarter basis. This implies an annualized
steady state nominal interest rate of 7%.
The preference and technology exogenous shocks follow an AR(1) process:
logZt =( 1− ρZ)logZ + ρZ logZt−1 + εZ
t εZ
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2
Z)
12Table 1: Selected variables volatilities and correlations. Sample: 1984–2004.
Standard Deviation Correlation with output
Variable Model U.S. data Model U.S. Data
Yt 1.80 .91 1 1
πt 0.80 .42 0.69 0.3
Rt 1.27 0.53 0.47 0.42
rt 0.78 0.56 0.1 0.12
where Z is the steady state value of the variable. The policy shock ε
mp
t is a Gaussian i.i.d.
stochastic process. The autocorrelation parameters are equal to ρa = ρd =0 .9. The standard
deviation of the innovations ε is set to σa =0 .35,σ d =8 ,σ mp =0 .1 (percent values). The low
value of the policy shock implies the largest part of the short term nominal interest rate dynamics
is driven by the systematic monetary policy reaction to the state of the economy. The preference
shock volatility is large, but very close to the one estimated by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2003)
on U.S. data. Compared to their estimates, the technology shock volatility is low. But as the
volatility of this shock increases, the correlation between nominal interest rate and GDP becomes
smaller and smaller, since a technology shock generates a negative correlation. Note that the
authors cited above adopt a model which includes a cost-push shock. This shock generates a strong
positive correlation between Rt and yt, and they estimate its volatility to be equal to 41.
An important concern in the parametrization of the shocks has been to match the correlations
between output and nominal and real rates with U.S. data, to be able to evaluate whether the term
structure generated by the model can predict output variation, as many empirical studies have
found in the US. Table 1 summarizes the main statistics for the model, and compares them to U.S.
data.8 The match with empirical correlations is satisfactory. To obtain this result though the model
simulated volatilities for output, nominal interest rate and inﬂation turn out to be substantially
larger than in the data.
In Table 1 the data sample spans the last two decades, in the hope of summarizing the business
cycle properties of the U.S. economy under a homogenous monetary policy regime. Table 2 compares
the model’s second moments to the whole U.S. post-war data sample.9 This sample is heterogenous
with respect to the U.S. monetary policy goals and the US Federal Reserve operating procedures,
and includes the 1970s inﬂationary episode. On the other hand, the sample can be considered more
8Note: Standard deviation measured in percent. The output series is logged and Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered. U.S.
data: Yt is real GDP, πt is CPI inﬂation, Rt is 3-months T-bill rate, rt is ex-post short term real interest rate. All
rates are on a quarter basis. Quarterly data sample is 2:1984–1:2004. Data are taken from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank FRED II database.
9Standard deviation measured in percent. The output series is logged and Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered. U.S. data:
Yt is real GDP, πt is CPI inﬂation, Rt is 3-months T-bill rate, rt is ex-post short term real interest rate. All rates
are on a quarter basis. Quarterly data sample is 1:1947–1:2004. Data are taken from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank FRED II database.
13Table 2: Selected variables volatilities and correlations. Sample: 1947–2004.
Standard Deviation Correlation with output
Variable Model U.S. data Model U.S. Data
Yt 1.81 .69 1 1
πt 0.80 .87 0.69 0.27
Rt 1.27 0.74 0.47 0.17
rt 0.78 0.80 . 1 −0.16
representative of the variety of shocks that drove the U.S. business cycle. As expected, the standard
deviations of all U.S. variables increases. The correlations of output with inﬂation and the ex-post
real interest rate drop signiﬁcantly, and become much smaller compared to the 1984-2004 sample
values and to the model theoretical prediction.
5. The Term Structure of Interest Rates
The Real and Nominal Term Structures
































14The bond prices are invariant with respect to time, and hence equations (24) and (25) give a
recursive formula for pricing zero-coupon real and nominal bonds of any maturity. For simplicity,
we next express rates for only real rates. Nominal rates are obtained in a similar manner.









and the above prices are related to interest rates (or yields) by
ft,n = −log(p
f
t,n)a n drt,n = −(1/n)log(pb
t,n). (26)
To deﬁne the risk premium as in Sargent (1987), write (24) for a two-period bond using the





























Since the conditional covariance term is zero for risk-neutral investors, we call it the risk premium




























Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations with for the nominal and
real term structure in the model, and for the U.S. nominal data as estimated by McCulloch and
Kwon (1993) from the ﬁrst quarter of 1947 until the fourth quarter of 1990 and by Duﬀee (2001)
from the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 until the fourth quarter of 1998. Output is ﬁltered using the Hodrick-
Prescott (1980) ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 both in the model data in data.
The Table shows that both real and nominal term structures are procyclical. In data, short
maturities are procyclical and long maturities countercyclical. In contrast, the nominal term spreads
are clearly countercyclical both in data and in model. Both the nominal and real term structures
generated by the model are mostly upward-sloping, but the long end of nominal term structure
slightly slopes downward. In data, the term structure is clearly upward-sloping. Means are matched
quite well; in model the nominal yields from three months until 20 years vary from 5% to 6.73% and
in data from 5% to 6.5%. Similarly, the average term spreads are produced by the model are quite
15close to the average term spreads in data. The term structure of volatilities in model is strongly
downward-sloping while in data it is essentially ﬂat.10 However, the average standard deviations
across maturities are roughly the same in data and in model.
In addition, the model produces strong positive correlation between yields and (the cyclical
component of) output while in data the correlation is low and positive for short maturities and
essentially zero for long maturities. The strong positive correlation in the model is a product of
the large shocks autocorrelation. Persistent shocks are needed to obtain suﬃcient volatility of rates
at the long end. The downside is that correlations with output will be very high as shocks die
out slowly. Possible remedies are introducing hybrid inﬂation and/or time-varying inﬂation target.
Both would give a larger volatility of interest rate at long maturities, with smaller shocks variance,
probably lowering the correlation.
The Expectations Hypothesis
The oldest and simplest theory about the information content of the term structure is so called
(pure) expectations hypothesis. According to the pure expectations theory forward rates are un-
biased predictors of future spot rates. It is also common to modify the theory so that constant
risk-premium is allowed—this is usually called the expectations hypothesis. However, it should be
noted that both versions of the expectations hypothesis are always incorrect. To see this, let us











From the Jensen’s inequality it follows that
f1,t <E t[r1,t+1] (28)
and the diﬀerence between the left and right hand side of (28) varies with Et[r1,t+1]a n dv a r t[r1,t+1].
This eﬀect is known as convexity premium or bias.
Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989), on the other hand, tested the expectations hypothesis in the














to see if b = 0. They generated 200 observations 1000 times and used Wald test with White (1980)
standard errors to check if b = 0 with 5% signiﬁcance level. They could reject the hypothesis only
roughly 50 times out of 1000 regressions which is what one would expect from chance alone. On
10If one restricts the attention to 1980:1 to 1998:4 data sample, the the term structure of volatility is clearly
downward-sloping. The standard deviation of the three-month yield is 3.05 and the standard deviation of the 20-year
yield is 1.77. In addition, in the UK nominal and real data the term structure of volatilities is downward-sloping, see
Sepp¨ al¨ a (2000).
16Table 3: Main term structure statistics. (N/A missing due to shortage of data.)
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month real yield (model) 2.06381 3.23813 0.08726
1-year real yield (model) 3.32266 2.91786 0.35683
10-year real yield (model) 3.93816 1.00484 0.58524
20-year real yield (model) 3.97521 0.55389 0.58615
30-year real yield (model) 3.99029 0.37829 0.58336
10-year minus 3-month real (model) 1.87435 2.71671 0.11245
20-year minus 3-month real (model) 1.91140 2.92054 0.01442
30-year minus 3-month real (model) 1.92648 3.01215 −0.02054
10-year minus 1-year real (model) 0.61550 2.08035 −0.21780
20-year minus 1-year real (model) 0.65255 2.44158 −0.29346
30-year minus 1-year real (model) 0.66764 2.58823 −0.31701
3-month nominal yield (model) 5.00436 5.15380 0.47255
1-year nominal yield (model) 6.33660 4.97113 0.56127
10-year nominal yield (model) 6.75250 1.53730 0.61543
20-year nominal yield (model) 6.71831 0.87280 0.60586
30-year nominal yield (model) 6.69836 0.59335 0.60582
10-year minus 3-month nominal (model) 1.74813 3.78465 −0.39352
20-year minus 3-month nominal (model) 1.71394 4.35994 −0.43731
30-year minus 3-month nominal (model) 1.69399 4.61190 −0.45013
10-year minus 1-year nominal (model) 0.41589 3.47529 −0.53061
20-year minus 1-year nominal (model) 0.38170 4.11731 −0.54923
30-year minus 1-year nominal (model) 0.36175 4.39051 −0.55362
3-month nominal yield (data) 5.06450 3.05130 0.14735
1-year nominal yield (data) 5.47900 3.12905 0.12193
10-year nominal yield (data) 6.22462 2.96448 −0.00705
20-year nominal yield (data) 6.54877 3.15684 −0.05252
30-year nominal yield (data) N/A N/A N/A
10-year minus 3-month nominal (data) 1.16012 1.15935 −0.40586
20-year minus 3-month nominal (data) 1.04854 1.32304 −0.41947
30-year minus 3-month nominal (data) N/A N/A N/A
10-year minus 1-year nominal (data) 0.74561 0.96807 −0.41570
20-year minus 1-year nominal (data) 0.62854 1.13526 −0.39922
30-year minus 1-year nominal (data) N/A N/A N/A




























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 52 1000 66
Wald(b = 0) 948 61 92 63
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
Table 5: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0 ) 7 25 65 44 2
Wald(b = 0 ) 6 75 66 65 6
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
the other hand, for all values of b except −1, the forward premium is still useful in forecasting the
changes in spot prices. The hypothesis b = −1 was rejected every time.
Table 4 presents the number of rejections of diﬀerent Wald tests in the regressions
yt+1 = a + bxt
in our benchmark model for nominal term structure. Table 5 presents the same tests when the
habit-formation parameter b = 0. Table 6 displays the same tests for real term structure, and
table 7 displays the test for real term structure with b = 0. Only our benchmark model is roughly
consistent with empirical evidence on the expectations hypothesis. The model can generate enough
variation in the risk premia to account for the rejections of the expectations hypothesis 95% of
the time. On the hand, when the risk premium is substracted from pb
1,t+1 − p
f
1,t b is equal to zero
with 5% signiﬁcance level. Comparing the tables, is is clear that habit-formation is a necessary
condition for the rejection of expectations hypothesis. However, since the hypothesis is rejected for
real term structure only about 75% of the time, it seems to be the case the monetary policy, which
mostly aﬀects nominal rates, plays also an important role. This issue is studied in more detail in
Section 6.
In Table 8 the results of the regression (29) are presented for one realization of 200 real and
nominal observations and for the data. The data are quarterly observations from 1960:1 to 1998:4
of three and six-month U.S. Treasury bills. In Table 8, Wald rows refer to the marginal signiﬁcance
level of the corresponding Wald test. The expectations hypothesis can be rejected at 5% critical
level for simulated nominal data but not for simulated real data. We return to this question in
Section 6.



























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 58 1000 55
Wald(b = 0) 775 47 102 61
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
Table 7: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for real term structure



























Wald(a = b = 0 ) 6 86 86 16 0
Wald(b = 0 ) 7 16 86 55 2
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
Table 8: The tests of the expectations hypothesis in a single regression.
Variable/Test Benchmark Real Benchmark Nominal Data
a 0.0035 0.0035 0.0008
se(a) 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005
b −0.1198 −0.2189 −0.4866
se(b) 0.0795 0.0601 0.1458
R2 0.0148 0.0915 0.1505
Wald(a = b = 0) 0 0 0.0003
Wald(b = 0) 0.13206 0.000027 0.0008
Wald(b = −1) 0 0 0.0004
19Table 9: Expectations hypothesis regressions in rates.
Regression a se(a) b se(b) R2
Benchmark (n =2 ) −0.1028 0.2181 0.3581 0.2164 0.0114
Benchmark (n = 3) 0.1122 0.4317 0.2046 0.2307 0.0032
Benchmark (n = 4) 0.2858 0.5953 0.1245 0.2318 0.0013
Benchmark (n = 5) 0.3477 0.7080 0.1214 0.2315 0.0014
Benchmark (n = 6) 0.4433 0.7838 0.1686 0.2216 0.0029
Benchmark (n = 11) 0.4736 0.9207 0.2916 0.1871 0.0129
Data (n = 2) 0.1259 0.1720 −1.3078 0.4016 0.0682
Data (n = 3) 0.4494 0.3349 −1.6873 0.5588 0.0758
Data (n = 4) 0.9220 0.4552 −1.9917 0.6277 0.0851
Data (n = 5) 1.2799 0.5718 −2.2363 0.7023 0.0861
Data (n = 6) 1.5000 0.6808 −2.5348 0.7715 0.0922
Data (n = 11) 3.0204 1.2524 −3.3127 1.2728 0.0722
Recent empirical literature has concentrated on the Log Pure Expectations Hypothesis. Ac-
cording to the hypothesis, the n-period forward rate should equal the expected one-period interest
rate n periods ahead:
fn,t = Et[r1,t+n].
To test the hypothesis, one can run the regression
(n − 1) ∗ (rn−1,t+1 − rn,t)=a + b(rn,t − r1,t)f o r n =2 ,3,4,5,6,11 years. (30)
According to the Log Pure Expectations Hypothesis, one should ﬁnd that b =1 . 11 Table 9 sum-
marizes the results from this regression for the models and data from 1960:1 to 1998:4. The
expectations hypothesis is again clearly rejected both in the model and in data.12
The Term Structure Predictions of Future Economic Activity
Despite the fact that the expectations hypothesis has been rejected over and over again in the
empirical literature, it has also been found that the term and forward spreads forecast changes
in the interest rates, consumption growth, and other economic activity. In this section, we will
compare the predictions of our benchmark model to two famous empirical papers on the term
structure and the future economic activity.
The ﬁrst paper is by Fama and Bliss (1987) who use forward spread to predict the future
changes in one-year interest rates one to four years ahead. Table 10 presents the regression results
of equation
r1,t+n − r1,t = a + b(fn,t − r1,t)f o r n =1 ,2,3,4y e a r s
11See, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and McKinley (1997).
12The coeﬃcients of b, however, have diﬀerent signs in the model and in data. The model doesn’t seem to capture
the full magnitude of how clearly the expectations hypothesis is rejected in data. It is interesting to note that the
model coeﬃcients are quite close to the data on UK nominal yields as presented in Sepp¨ al¨ a (2000).
20Table 10: Forward spread forecasts of future interest rate changes n years ahead.
Regression a se(a) b se(b) R2
Benchmark (n = 1) 0.2468 0.1296 0.0811 0.0267 0.0424
Benchmark (n = 2) 1.5229 0.4965 0.4651 0.0758 0.1384
Benchmark (n = 3) 1.8843 0.5520 0.5627 0.0731 0.2175
Benchmark (n = 4) 1.9653 0.5424 0.6389 0.0689 0.2995
Data (n = 1) 0.6546 0.1255 −1.2593 0.1828 0.2719
Data (n = 2) 0.0019 0.2788 0.1575 0.2533 0.0034
Data (n =3 ) −0.1298 0.3074 0.5794 0.2744 0.0431
Data (n =4 ) −0.3871 0.2911 0.8665 0.2163 0.0950
for the data from 1960:1 to 1998:4 and the benchmark model with 200 observations. The standard
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. In both cases, b increases
with the forecast horizon. With longer maturities, the match is quite good. On the other hand,
R2 increases in the model and decreases in data with the forecast horizon. It should be noted that
in the original Fama and Bliss paper, the R2 also increased with forecast horizon as in our model.
The main diﬀerence between our data and the data used by Fama and Bliss is that the latter used
monthly data from January 1965 to December 1984. In their data sample, the interest rates have
strong mean reverting property that increases the forecast power in longer horizons. On the other
hand, in our sample the downward trend in data since the early 1980’s dominates the data and
decreases the forecasting power in longer horizons.
The second paper is Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) who use the term spread to predict the
future changes in the log consumption growth one to four years ahead. The data are quarterly
observations from 1960:1 to 1998:4 of U.S. consumption non-durables plus services regressed on
10-year government bonds less three-month Treasury bill rates. Table 11 presents the regression
results of equation
(100/n) ∗ (log(ct+n) − log(ct)) = a + b(r10,t − r1,t)f o r n =1 ,2,3,4y e a r s
for the data and the benchmark model. The standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors. Upward-sloping term structure clearly predicts expansions both in our
model and in data, and downward-sloping term structure clearly predicts recessions, again, both in
the model and in data. Again, R2 increases in the model and decreases in data with the forecast
horizon. This feature of the model is largely a result the high shocks autocorrelation (see the
discussion page 16).
21Table 11: Term spread forecasts of future consumption growth n years ahead.
Regression a se(a) b se(b) R2
Benchmark (n = 1) 0.0385 0.1939 0.1413 0.0384 0.0656
Benchmark (n = 2) 0.0697 0.1462 0.1418 0.0270 0.1194
Benchmark (n = 3) 0.0403 0.1155 0.1255 0.0227 0.1583
Benchmark (n = 4) 0.0090 0.0899 0.1176 0.0178 0.2141
Data (n = 1) 3.0990 0.1353 0.3164 0.1828 0.0758
Data (n = 2) 3.1785 0.1156 0.2070 0.0772 0.0504
Data (n = 3) 3.2580 0.1027 0.0564 0.0657 0.0052
Data (n = 4) 3.3688 0.0882 −0.0427 0.0523 0.0038
6. Monetary Policy and Inﬂation Risk Premium










To deﬁne the inﬂation risk premium, write (31) using the deﬁnition conditional covariance and the









































Since the conditional covariance term is zero for risk-neutral investors and when inﬂation process








































22Table 12: Main inﬂation risk premia statistics.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
Inﬂation risk premium (n =1 ) −0.02152 0.00587 −0.41487
Inﬂation risk premium (n =2 ) −0.05897 0.01254 −0.40707
Inﬂation risk premium (n =4 ) −0.16307 0.02295 −0.36519
Inﬂation risk premium (n =8 ) −0.38759 0.03534 −0.20202
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 12) −0.55246 0.04527 0.18787
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 16) −0.64817 0.06306 0.42333
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 20) −0.69205 0.08089 0.47417
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 24) −0.70403 0.09668 0.47655
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 28) −0.69623 0.10807 0.48398
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 32) −0.67399 0.11668 0.48397
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 36) −0.64554 0.12241 0.47302
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 40) −0.61329 0.12529 0.49829
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 60) −0.45001 0.09238 0.48880
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 80) −0.33307 0.06904 0.44080
or by taking logs and multiplying by −(1/n):











That is, nominal interest rate equals the sum of the (ex-ante) real interest rate and the average
expected inﬂation.
Table 12 presents the main statistics for the inﬂation risk premia in our benchmark case, and
Figures 1–6 show the inﬂation risk premium (and other variables) respond to one standard deviation
shock in preferences, productivity, and monetary policy, respectively.
As Table 12 shows, the inﬂation risk premium is always negative, and hence positive preference
shock that increases inﬂation decreases inﬂation risk premium. That is, as inﬂation increases
inﬂation risk premium becomes more negative or larger. Similarly, positive productivity shock
decreases both inﬂation and the size of inﬂation risk premium (moves it closer to zero). Finally,
positive monetary policy shock decreases both inﬂation and the size of inﬂation risk premium.
Because the inﬂation risk premium is unobservable in data, it is hard to access the mean
and standard deviation of premia in Table 12. The best we can do is to compare how diﬀerent
parameters aﬀect the size and volatility of premia. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) argue that the time-
variation of the inﬂation risk premium is an important explanatory variable of deviations from the
expectations hypothesis. We address this question by varying the “aggressiveness” of the monetary
with respect to inﬂation, i.e., the parameter ωπ. Table 13 presents the inﬂation risk premia statistics
when ωπ = 3. Notice that premia are considerably smaller and less volatile than in our benchmark
with more aggressive monetary policy. This is not surprising. The more aggressive is the policy
the lower and less volatile is inﬂation, and hence investors do not ask as much compensation for
inﬂation volatility.



































Figure 1: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation preference shock in the benchmark
parameterization.



































Figure 2: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation preference shock in the benchmark
parameterization.



































Figure 3: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation productivity shock in the benchmark
parameterization.





































Figure 4: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation productivity shock in the benchmark
parameterization.





































Figure 5: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation monetary policy shock in the
benchmark parameterization.






































Figure 6: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation monetary policy shock in the
benchmark parameterization.
26Table 13: Main inﬂation risk premia statistics when ωπ =3 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
Inﬂation risk premium (n =1 ) −0.00862 0.00417 −0.54447
Inﬂation risk premium (n =2 ) −0.02999 0.00873 −0.53235
Inﬂation risk premium (n =4 ) −0.09462 0.01505 −0.51060
Inﬂation risk premium (n =8 ) −0.23582 0.02018 −0.37049
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 12) −0.33871 0.02286 0.07227
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 16) −0.39823 0.03216 0.38099
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 20) −0.42545 0.04301 0.44461
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 24) −0.43273 0.05210 0.45677
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 28) −0.42779 0.05892 0.47216
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 32) −0.41364 0.06449 0.46797
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 36) −0.39583 0.06882 0.45334
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 40) −0.37563 0.07068 0.48285
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 60) −0.27331 0.05142 0.47720
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 80) −0.20098 0.03938 0.41296
Table 14: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 50 1000 71
Wald(b = 0) 983 56 97 69
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
However, Table 14 shows that the expectations hypothesis is actually rejected more often when
the policy is more aggressive. Moreover, Table 15 presents the inﬂation risk premia statistics
when ωπ =1 .2. The premia are much larger and more volatile. But Table 16 shows that the
expectations hypothesis is actually rejected less often when the policy is less aggressive. That is,
unlike in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), inﬂation risk premium is not the explanation for the rejections
of expectations hypothesis.
How can that be? Mankiw and Summers (1984) and Mankiw and Miron (1986) show that the
estimate of b in the expectations hypothesis regression in rates (30) converges to
plimˆ b =
var(Et∆rt+1)+2c o r r ( ψt,E t∆rt+1)std(Et∆rt+1)std(ψt)
var(Et∆rt+1)+4v a r ( ψt) + 4corr(ψt,E t∆rt+1)std(Et∆rt+1)std(ψt)
, (32)
where ψt is the term premium. Notice that if ψt is deterministic, i.e., std(ψt) = 0, plimˆ b =1 .
Also, observe that as std(ψt) increases, plimˆ b decreases. Finally, (32) is a complicated function
27Table 15: Main inﬂation risk premia statistics when ωπ =1 .2.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
Inﬂation risk premium (n =1 ) −0.04423 0.01387 0.42590
Inﬂation risk premium (n =2 ) −0.11610 0.03258 0.41053
Inﬂation risk premium (n =4 ) −0.33723 0.07986 0.40715
Inﬂation risk premium (n =8 ) −0.88928 0.17094 0.38337
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 12) −1.33503 0.25524 0.45048
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 16) −1.61328 0.33652 0.50424
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 20) −1.75971 0.39659 0.51349
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 24) −1.82118 0.45157 0.49452
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 28) −1.82818 0.49612 0.48720
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 32) −1.79790 0.52048 0.49139
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 36) −1.74663 0.52422 0.48779
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 40) −1.68178 0.52357 0.50495
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 60) −1.32811 0.42376 0.47136
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 80) −1.04778 0.34960 0.40516
Table 16: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 59 1000 77
Wald(b = 0) 286 56 77 64
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
28Table 17: Main inﬂation risk premia statistics when χ =0 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
Inﬂation risk premium (n =1 ) −0.04142 0.02792 −0.58377
Inﬂation risk premium (n =2 ) −0.10549 0.05441 −0.58067
Inﬂation risk premium (n =4 ) −0.27086 0.09143 −0.56336
Inﬂation risk premium (n =8 ) −0.61949 0.11888 −0.42942
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 12) −0.89103 0.12351 −0.12946
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 16) −1.06158 0.14742 0.18314
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 20) −1.14887 0.17832 0.33769
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 24) −1.18473 0.21687 0.41650
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 28) −1.18562 0.24489 0.46531
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 32) −1.15817 0.26308 0.49031
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 36) −1.12056 0.28413 0.49048
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 40) −1.07382 0.29335 0.49224
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 60) −0.81736 0.22491 0.44980
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 80) −0.62867 0.17684 0.44566
Table 18: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 63 1000 75
Wald(b = 0) 764 66 86 74
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
of std(Et∆rt+1), but if std(Et∆rt+1) = 0, then plimˆ b = 0. Moreover, as std(Et∆rt+1) →∞ ,
plimˆ b → 1. Hence, the lower is std(Et∆rt+1) the easier it is to reject the expectations hypothesis.
Empirical evidence supports this interpretation. Mankiw and Miron (1986) show that it is much
more diﬃcult to reject the expectations hypothesis using data prior to the founding of the Fed.13
They suggest that the explanation is the Federal Reserve’s commitment to stabilizing interest rates.
We next study the issue by setting the interest rate smoothing parameter χ =0 . A ss h o w n
in Tables 17 and 18, similarly as with ωπ =1 .2, we get larger inﬂation risk premium and fewer
rejections of expectations hypothesis.
13Choi and Wohar (1991) cannot reject the expectations hypothesis over the sample period of 1910–1914.
29Table 19: Main term structure statistics when σmp =0 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 5.02277 5.13179 0.47615
1-year nominal yield 6.34453 4.96382 0.56358
10-year nominal yield 6.75754 1.53661 0.61642
20-year nominal yield 6.72312 0.87224 0.60621
30-year nominal yield 6.70322 0.59275 0.60425
Table 20: Main term structure statistics when σa =0 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 5.03020 5.10918 0.48620
1-year nominal yield 6.34650 4.93666 0.57515
10-year nominal yield 6.76003 1.52846 0.63147
20-year nominal yield 6.72685 0.86730 0.62396
30-year nominal yield 6.70767 0.58829 0.62600
7. Which Shocks Matter?
In our baseline model, we have three diﬀerent shocks: a technology shock, a preference shock,
and a monetary policy shock. In this section we investigate the importance of these diﬀerent shocks.
No Monetary Policy Shocks (σmp =0 )
With no monetary policy shocks, the results are almost exactly the same as in our benchmark case,
see Table 19.
No Technology Shocks (σa =0 )
With no technology shocks, the results are almost exactly the same as in our benchmark case, see
Table 20. Since neither monetary policy nor technology shocks matter for our results, it must be
the case that the demand shock plays the most crucial role in the model.
No Demand Shocks (σd =0 )
Without demand shocks, the interest rates are much less volatile and ﬂatter as presented in Table 21.
In addition, interest rates and inﬂation are countercyclical. However, the expectations hypothesis
is still rejected roughly 50% of the time as shown in Table 22.
30Table 21: Main term structure statistics when σd =0 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 6.90371 1.29485 −0.63981
1-year nominal yield 6.97045 1.13743 −0.63810
10-year nominal yield 6.98185 0.30401 −0.61539
20-year nominal yield 6.97930 0.17013 −0.61407
30-year nominal yield 6.97820 0.11473 −0.61255
Table 22: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0) 879 52 668 58
Wald(b = 0) 549 64 118 56
Wald(b = −1) 999 1000 1000 1000
Summary
Summarizing, monetary policy and technology shocks are not crucial for our results. Preference
shocks are crucial for matching the cyclical behavior of the interest rates but not for the rejections
of the expectations hypothesis. These results are somewhat similar to Nakajima (2003) who shows
that the standard RBC model driven by the Solow residual cannot explain the “preference residual”
(the diﬀerence between real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure), but the model driven by the preference residual can account for the Solow residual.
8. Conclusions
We show that a New Keynesian model with habit-persistent preferences and a monetary policy
feedback rule with interest rate smoothing produces pro-cyclical interest rates, counter-cyclical
term spreads, and creates enough volatility in the risk premium to account for the rejections of
expectations hypothesis. Our results are related to conclusion reached by Dotsey and Otrok (1995)
“[R]egression results [for the expectations hypothesis] that are in accord with those
obtained in practise can be generated by the combination of (i) Fed behavior that both
smooths the movements in interest rates...and (ii) time-varying term premia that are
calibrated to match data moments.”
In our model, habit formation delivers (ii) and interest rate smoothing delivers (i). Without habit
formation, we reject the expectations hypothesis only 5% of the time. With habit formation but
31without interest rate smoothing, we reject 75% of the time. With habit formation and interest rate
smoothing, we reject the expectation hypothesis 95% of the time. It is important to note that in
our model, it is the systematic monetary policy that brings our results, and not the monetary policy
shocks as in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005). We also ﬁnd that monetary policy and the technology
shocks are not crucial for our results. Preference shocks are crucial for matching the cyclical
behavior of the interest rates but not for the rejections of the expectations hypothesis.
A. The Inﬂation Rate Dynamics
By iterating (16) and (17), we obtain:
ˆ Gt+1 = µMUCt+1MCt+1Pθ−1
t+1 Yt+1 + θpβ ˆ Gt+2
ˆ Gt+2 = µMUCt+2MCt+2Pθ−1
t+2 Yt+2 + θpβ ˆ Gt+3
ˆ Ht+1 = MUCt+1Pθ−1
t+1 Yt+1 + θpβ ˆ Ht+2
ˆ Ht+2 = MUCt+2Pθ−1
t+2 Yt+2 + θpβ ˆ Ht+3
or
ˆ Gt = µMUCtMCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ
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To obtain stationary variables under a positive money growth rate steady state regime start from
equations (16)–(17) and divide ˆ Gt by Pθ











































= MUCtYt + θpβ ˜ Ht+1(1 + πt+1)θ−1 (38)
































the law of motion for the price index
P1−θ
t = θpP1−θ
t−1 +( 1− θp)Pt(z)1−θ = θpP1−θ

























33Table 23: Main term structure statistics when b =0 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 6.98623 1.44943 0.30692
1-year nominal yield 6.99047 1.34408 0.39468
10-year nominal yield 6.99022 0.40513 0.46418
20-year nominal yield 6.98662 0.23048 0.45700
30-year nominal yield 6.98467 0.15837 0.45925
Table 24: Main term structure statistics when γ =1 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 6.44966 2.83037 0.54434
1-year nominal yield 6.82969 2.67349 0.60100
10-year nominal yield 6.94103 0.81430 0.62670
20-year nominal yield 6.93018 0.46307 0.61998
30-year nominal yield 6.92388 0.31558 0.62013
B. Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section, we brieﬂy describe seven diﬀerent experiments to illustrate the features of our
model. We only concentrate on most dramatic diﬀerences with the benchmark model. Details are
available on request.
Test #1: No Habit Formation (b =0 )
Table 23 shows the average yield curve when there is no habit formation present in the model.
The term structure is ﬂat, and hence it is no surprise that—as shown earlier in Table 5—habit
formation is a necessary condition for the rejection of expectations hypothesis.
Test #2: Logarithmic Preferences (γ =1 )
With less curvature in the utility function, the the term structure is much ﬂatter than in our
benchmark case, as shown in Table 24.
Test #3: No Interest Rate Smoothing (χ =0 )
When the monetary policy authority conducts no interest rate smoothing, the interest rates, not
surprisingly, are much more volatile and steeper as presented in Table 25. Moreover, it is more
diﬃcult to reject expectations hypothesis as discussed in Section 6.
34Table 25: Main term structure statistics when χ =0 .
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 1.75643 9.31439 0.54641
1-year nominal yield 5.30754 8.63865 0.57931
10-year nominal yield 6.20336 2.34314 0.59335
20-year nominal yield 6.11159 1.33083 0.58849
30-year nominal yield 6.05910 0.90156 0.58630
Table 26: Main term structure statistics when the steady inﬂation is zero.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 2.45515 4.44680 0.45301
1-year nominal yield 3.47719 4.32154 0.55143
10-year nominal yield 3.82458 1.37027 0.61767
20-year nominal yield 3.80241 0.77660 0.60937
30-year nominal yield 3.78915 0.52855 0.60917
Test #4: Zero Steady State Inﬂation
When the steady state inﬂation is zero, the nominal interest rates are lower, as presented in Table 26.
However, this doesn’t aﬀect the model’s ability to reject the expectations hypothesis as shown in
Table 27.
Test #5: Higher Steady State Inﬂation
When the steady state inﬂation is twice as large, 6% per year, the nominal interest rates are much
higher as presented in Table 28. However, this doesn’t aﬀect the model’s ability to reject the
expectations hypothesis as shown in Table 29.
Test #6: Monetary Policy Responds to Output (ωy =0 .2)
When the monetary policy authority responds, in addition to expected inﬂation, to output, inﬂation
becomes countercyclical, its correlation with Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered output is now −0.49965. In
addition, the inﬂation risk premium is now positive as shown in Table 30 and the responses of
inﬂation and inﬂation risk premium to productivity and policy shocks are opposite to the benchmark
as shown in Figures 7–10.
Test #7: Less Aggressive Policy (ωπ =1 .2)
In addition to discussion in Section 6, Table 31 presents the main term structure statistics when
ωπ =1 .2. The term structure is now downward-sloping.
35Table 27: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 52 1000 69
Wald(b = 0) 982 68 111 75
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
Table 28: Main term structure statistics when the steady inﬂation is zero.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 6.95375 7.11755 0.43617
1-year nominal yield 9.00367 6.39357 0.50942
10-year nominal yield 9.53720 1.89879 0.56305
20-year nominal yield 9.46099 1.08623 0.54786
30-year nominal yield 9.41742 0.73584 0.54986
Table 29: The number of rejects in each regressions in the benchmark model for nominal term



























Wald(a = b = 0) 1000 68 1000 86
Wald(b = 0) 945 61 554 66
Wald(b = −1) 1000 1000 1000 1000
36Table 30: Main inﬂation risk premia statistics when ωy =0 .2.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 1) 0.01011 0.00264 0.35059
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 2) 0.02017 0.00543 0.34348
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 4) 0.03963 0.01039 0.32541
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 8) 0.07367 0.01727 0.32784
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 12) 0.09690 0.01878 0.28703
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 16) 0.10847 0.01702 0.23165
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 20) 0.11100 0.01517 0.20666
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 24) 0.10814 0.01295 0.15303
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 28) 0.10227 0.01136 0.07226
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 32) 0.09455 0.01063 −0.02135
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 36) 0.08635 0.01094 −0.08923
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 40) 0.07819 0.01108 −0.15924
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 60) 0.04539 0.00676 −0.28747
Inﬂation risk premium (n = 80) 0.02646 0.00455 −0.20864
Table 31: Main term structure statistics when ωπ =1 .2.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
3-month nominal yield 6.44017 7.28137 0.46761
1-year nominal yield 6.83520 7.01192 0.54884
10-year nominal yield 6.08160 2.19782 0.60213
20-year nominal yield 5.80191 1.29816 0.57477
30-year nominal yield 5.64862 0.86674 0.58781



































Figure 7: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation productivity shock in the benchmark
parameterization when ωy =0 .2.



































Figure 8: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation productivity shock in the benchmark
parameterization when ωy =0 .2.

































Figure 9: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation monetary policy shock in the
benchmark parameterization when ωy =0 .2.








































Figure 10: Impulse response functions to one standard deviation monetary policy shock in the
benchmark parameterization when ωy =0 .2.
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